Listed below is McConnaughhay, Coonrod, Pope, Weaver & Stern, P.A.'s workers' compensation case law database. The database dates back until 1971 and includes over 5500 workers' compensation court decisions.
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The employer/carrier appealed an order from the JCC denying their Motion to Enforce a settlement agreement. Court determined that it had no jurisdiction to review an order denying enforcement of a settlement agreement where the order was not final and did not fall within Rule 9.180(b)1 as to the finite list of appealable non-final orders. Unlike an order that does enforce a settlement agreement which is appealable, the court determined that an order denying enforcement of an order to enforce a settlement agreement is non-appealable.
The parties entered into a mediation agreement that the employer/carrier would provide "the requested bed." Instead of providing the brand of bed specified in a doctor's prescription, which was not incorporated by reference in the agreement, the employer/carrier attempted to deliver a different type of bed. The claimant filed a Motion to Enforce the Mediation Agreement. The JCC concluded that there was no meeting of the minds in regards to the stipulated agreement and therefore denied the Motion to Enforce. On appeal, JCC's order affirmed.
The court determined that the claimant, as the party seeking to enforce the agreement, has the burden of proof that both parties meant the same thing when they entered into the agreement. The claimant was unable to convince the JCC that the agreement was founded on a meeting of the minds and therefore, unenforceable. Parol evidence is admitted to resolve a contract's ambiguity only when the ambiguity is latent. If the parties are able to read the same document and come to opposite but equally reasonable conclusions, the ambiguity is considered latent. The JCC did not err in admitting or relying on parol evidence which supports the JCC's ruling.
Parties entered into a settlement agreement at mediation and as a part of the overall agreement, the claimant was to "execute a general release and resignation in favor of the employer." Settlement documents ultimately prepared included an Indemnity and hold harmless agreement. Claimant's attorney refused to agree to the indemnity and hold harmless agreement and filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, not including the indemnity and hold harmless agreement.
It is within the jurisdiction of the JCC to determine whether a settlement was reached and if so, to establish its terms. Settlement agreements are governed by the laws for interpretation of contracts are highly favored, and will be enforced whenever possible. The making of a contract depends not on the agreement of two minds and one intention but on the agreement of two sets of external signs - not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.
The court differentiated between a general release which was agreed to at the mediation settlement agreement as opposed to an indemnification agreement. Since the parties had agreed only to a release and not an indemnification agreement, court determined that the settlement was consistent with the agreement at mediation and accordingly, determined that the settlement without an indemnity provision was consistent with the agreement between the parties. Accordingly, the motion to grant the settlement should have been entered by the JCC.
Rule 60Q-6.123(5) provides that a claim for cost reimbursement in the amount of $250 or less shall not be set forth with specificity or detail. This provision only applies to settlements under Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, in which the claimant pays costs. In regards to the payment of costs apart from settlements, the parties are permitted to stipulate to the payment of attorney's fees and costs with no requirement that the agreed upon costs be justified or detailed. Such matters are governed by the law of contracts, with no specialized rules.
Employer/carrier and claimant settled workers' compensation claim and as part of the settlement, entered into a side stipulation for the payment of a $1,500 attorney's fee. JCC approved the attorney's fee related to the settlement of the case but disapproved the side stipulated fee determining that there was no evidence that the attorney obtained benefits for the benefit of the claimant. On appeal, judge's order reversed, it being determined that the evidence of record did support the claimant's attorney's entitlement to a side stipulated fee. See also Cuenca v. Nova Southeastern University, 160 So. 3d 941 and Rivas v. Oasis Outsourcing, Inc., 147 So. 3d 670.
In settlement proceedings, JCC denied side stipulation for the payment of fees by the employer/carrier in excess of those fees obtained as a part of the settlement. JCC denied side stipulation since there was no evidence to support the fact that claimed benefits in support of the side stipulation had been denied by the employer/carrier and not timely responded to when a petition was filed. Accordingly, record evidence did support the stipulation concerning the side fee. In a footnote to this case, the court noted that the appropriate procedure for a JCC to take judicial notice of his/her file is as set out in Sections 90.202 and 90.204, Florida Statutes. A JCC make take judicial notice of specific record on his "docket" after giving the parties advance notice of the intention to do so and a reasonable opportunity to object.
Claimant's former attorney represented the claimant in a workers' compensation matter that resulted in a settlement and also a federal wage and hour claim. Court determined that JCC did have jurisdiction to address the payment of costs by the claimant in regards to the workers' compensation claim. However, the JCC did not have jurisdiction to determine costs associated with the federal wage and hour claim because it was not directly related to the workers' compensation case.
JCC did not err in granting the employer/carrier's motion to enforce a mediated settlement agreement. JCC found that the claimant had knowingly and voluntarily settled all indemnity and medical benefits for a lump sum payment. The court however did determine that the JCC erred in re-writing part of the settlement terms requiring the signing of additional documents not agreed to at the time of the settlement agreement.
JCC erred in refusing to approve a stipulation between the parties whereby the employer/carrier would pay the claimant's attorney a $1,500 attorney's fee under Section 440.34(3)(a)7, Florida Statutes(2013). The JCC determined that there was no evidence that the attorney had earned a fee for this $1,500 stipulated sum. On appeal, JCC's order reversed. The JCC had failed to consider previously filed petitions for benefits for which the claimant's attorney was responsible for obtaining for his client. The $1,500 agreed upon attorney's fee was a side stipulation that was entered into between the parties at the time of the settlement of the claimant's case with the employer/carrier.
In Cabrera I, the claimant, unrepresented, was allowed to withdraw from a settlement agreement since the JCC had not approved the settlement. Because of the fact that the claimant was not represented by counsel and because the JCC had not approved the settlement, the settlement as alleged was not binding or enforceable. Thereafter, the claimant obtained the services of an attorney and settled the case at mediation which included the payment of an attorney's fee. Thereafter, the claimant again expressed displeasure with the amount of the settlement, the manner in which it was negotiated, and the means by which the settlement checks would be processed. Additional testimony was received by the JCC who determined that the agreed upon settlement included both dates of accident that the claimant allegedly suffered from while employed by the employer. Court determined on appeal that there was competent and substantial evidence to support the JCC's determination that "any and all dates of accidents" agreed to in the settlement documents settled the claimant's multiple injuries with the employer. DCA decided case by Summary Affirmance when the initial brief filed failed to present a preliminary basis for reversal of the JCC's order.
On appeal, the claimant asserted that he had not signed the settlement documents. This issue was not asserted in the proceedings before the JCC and because of the failure to do so, this issue was not preserved for appeal purposes. In Florida, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules that apply to counsel.
The court specifically found that there was no evidence that the claimant had been tricked into settling all of his dates of accident. The formation of the contract depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention but on the agreement of two sets of external signs - not on the parties having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing. In this case, the claimant had voluntarily entered into the agreement that expressly settled and extinguished the claimant's entitlement to workers' compensation benefits for all workers' compensation injuries. The claimant's subjective belief as to whether both accidents were settled is irrelevant to the legal issue.
JCC’s order disapproved an agreement between the claimant’s attorney and the employer/carrier for the employer/carrier to pay a fee of $1,500 for the obtaining of medical benefits for the claimant authorized by §440.34(3)(a), F.S. There was no supporting evidence of record showing that the claimant’s attorney ever got the claimant medical benefits which entitled the claimant’s attorney to a fee under the terms of this statutory provision. The judge’s order disapproving the fee directed that the $1,500 be paid to the claimant. This part of the judge’s decision was reversed. There was nothing in the stipulation that if the JCC did not approve the stipulated attorney’s fee that the amount would be paid to the claimant. The JCC is not a court of general jurisdiction and cannot reform contracts. The JCC was without authority to redirect the attorney’s fees from counsel to claimant as an exercise of plenary equitable jurisdiction.
On remand, the court indicated that the parties could petition for the approval of attorney’s fees payable to the claimant’s attorney under §440.34(3)(b), F.S., not paragraph (3)(a), F.S. Court determined that an agreed upon amount of $500 in the parties’ agreement designated as "out of pocket costs" payable by the employer/claimant (not her attorney) was not subject to the JCC’s approval. This amount was a negotiated payment to be made to claimant herself, not an attorney’s fee subject to the JCC’s approval under Chapter 440.
116 So. 3d 545 (3rd DCA 2013)
Injured worker settled his workers' compensation case with hisemployer and signed a broad release. Subsequently, cause of action filed against employer by injured worker. Summary judgment entered in favor of employer based on the legal conclusion that the claimant had elected his remedies afforded by the workers' compensation statutewhen the case was settled.
The cases which examine whether a plaintiff evidences a conscious intention to elect a remedy are divided into two groups: 1) Cases where compensability or the injured worker's status as an employee is an issue and 2) cases where the defendant's liability is claimed under an exception to the exclusive remedy statute and such was either waived or resolved in the workers' compensation case. Neither of these circumstances applied in this case.
Court determined that the claimant had elected his remedy under the Workers' Compensation Act by filing a Petition for Benefits, receiving payments, and negotiating a settlement. There was no question that the accident in this instance was compensable and benefits had been timely paid. Had the claim initially been contested, there would not have been an election of remedies by settling the WC case. Court determined that a provision in the release that the payment of a settlement should not be construed as an admission of any wrongdoing or liability on the part of the releasees did not affect the ruling that the employee had not elected his remedy by settling his workers' compensation case.
The plaintiff in this cause of action relied upon the Supreme Court opinion in Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc., 932 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006) which stated that where an employee is injured in the workplace during the course and scope of his employment, and receives workers' compensation benefits but does not pursue a compensation claim to a conclusion on the merits may still file an action against the employer if the employer's conduct is to the level of intentional conduct substantially certain to result in injury for which workers' compensation immunity is not available. The court determined that the Jones opinion stated that the claimant could pursue a cause of action based upon an exception to the exclusivity of the workers' compensation statute because none of those claims were litigated in the workers' compensation case.
In this case a claim was filed against the employer for "gross negligence" and "unrelated works". However, these exceptions to the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statute do not apply in regards to a claim against the employer. The gross negligence and unrelated works exceptions did not apply in this instance because the injured worker's co-employee was not being sued and any negligence on the part of the co-employee is not imputed to the employer.
A subcontractor on the same job as another subcontractor can be responsible to the employee another subcontractor (horizontal immunity) based on the gross negligence standard. Gross negligence requires: 1) circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and present danger amounting to a more than normal or usual peril, 2) knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the part of the tortfeasor, and 3) an act or omission that evidences a conscious disregard of the consequences. There was no evidence presented by the plaintiff in this instance that the circumstances surrounding the incident constituted an imminent or clear and present danger. The procedure that resulted in the claimant's injury had been performed on many occasions over many years without incident. Modifying a piece of machinery in such a way as to increase its dangerousness does not always amount to gross negligence. There was no evidence that the employer had knowledge of or was aware of an alleged imminent danger. There was also no evidence of a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's safety by the employer.
Finally, the court found that the employer's conduct did not rise to the level of an intentional act to injure. The definition of an intentional tort under the terms of Section 440.11,(1)(b), F.S., is intended to be the rarest of exceptions to the immunity granted to the employer. Accordingly, this issue is amenable to being decided by summary judgment. The possibility of an injury occurring as a result of an employer's conduct does not satisfy the "virtual certainty" standard defining intentional misconduct. There was no evidence in this case of prior accidents on the machine where the claimant was working when injured and there was no proof by clear and convincing evidence that the injured worker was unaware of the risk because the danger was not apparent or that the employer deliberately concealed or misrepresented a danger to the plaintiff.
JCC granted employer/carrier's motion to dismiss petition for benefits determining that benefits claimed had been settled. The claimant admitted that there had been a settlement but argued that the benefits claimed were due under the terms of the agreement and the agreement had not yet released the employer/carrier since the employer/carrier had not satisfied all sums due under the agreement. Court reversed judge's dismissal with prejudice concluding that the JCC should have had an evidentiary hearing and considered the terms of the parties' settlement agreement to determine if the terms of the agreement had in fact released the employer/carrier from liability and whether the employer/carrier had complied with the terms of the agreement.
With respect to a claimant who is not represented by counsel, settlement agreements are contingent upon JCC approval for the formation of a binding agreement and are not a legal agreement until approved by the JCC. Court refused to enforce settlement between employer/carrier and unrepresented claimant based upon a signed mediation agreement. Because resolution of the case involved the JCC's application of undisputed facts to the law, review by the appellate court was de novo.
Although the JCC has jurisdiction to determine whether a valid binding settlement agreement was reached and if so to establish its terms, competent and substantial evidence did not support the JCC's finding in this case that the employer/carrier had agreed to pay the premiums for the claimant's family health insurance. The only evidence in the record indicated that the employer/carrier agreed to deduct the cost of the claimant's family health insurance from temporary partial disability benefits otherwise payable to the claimant.
2nd DCA. In death claim, petition for workers' compensation benefits was filed which resulted in a settlement agreement. Thereafter, civil cause of action filed against employer by personal representative of deceased employee. A Motion to Dismiss was filed in civil cause of action alleging that the plaintiff had elected remedies under the Workers' Compensation Statute and accordingly was barred from filing the civil cause of action against employer. Lower court granted Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, decision of lower court reversed. Appeal considered on a de novo review by appellate court.
Election of remedies is an affirmative defense that is not properly raised by means of a Motion to Dismiss where the affirmative defense does not appear on the face of the complaint. In this case, the lower court considered matters outside of the four corners of the complaint in granting the Motion to Dismiss. If the court is required to consider matters outside the four corners of the complaint, then the cause is not subject to dismissal on the basis of a motion. The fact that the claimant had filed a petition for workers' compensation and had settled that case did not appear on the face of the complaint or any attachments to the complaint. Rather, it was supplied by the employer through various documents and an affidavit filed in support of its Motion to Dismiss.
Alternatively, the court determined that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice because the plaintiff in such circumstance had the right to amend the complaint once as a matter of right. An ore tenus motion was filed by plaintiff at the time of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss.
In accordance with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190(a), a party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsivle pleading is served. Court determined that the filing of a Motion to Dismiss was not deemed to be a responsive pleading and accordingly, the plaintiff in this instance should have been allowed to amend the complaint.
While represented by counsel, claimant entered into a separation agreement with the employer. After signing the separation agreement, he filed a Petition for Benefits claiming an accident on the job. Employer alleged that the separation agreement constituted a settlement of his workers' compensation claim and since he was represented at the time, it was not necessary for a judge to approve the settlement. Appellate review of case de novo since it involved the construction of a written instrument.
Because of the fact that the claimant was represented by an attorney at the time he completed the separation agreement ending his employment with the employer, the JCC did not need to approve the settlement if in fact it was a settlement of any workers' compensation claim. In this case, the court determined that the separation agreement was broad enough to include a possible workers' compensation claim. The plain language of the separation agreement included a workers' compensation claim and since the agreement did not require submission to the JCC for approval, court determined that all workers' compensation claims had been released. JCC erred in finding that the claimant had not settled his workers' compensation claim when he entered into the separation agreement. Dissenting opinion.
Court determined that parties had reached an agreement to settle and accordingly, the settlement was enforced. There were no contingencies in the agreement between the parties as to the settlement. Dissenting opinion. The dissenting judge concluded that, based on claimant's attorney's correspondence to the attorney for the employer/carrier that the settlement was not final until the parties received and approved an MSA and until the claimant approved all settlement documents including the filing of the settlement documents prior to a specified date.
The question in this case was whether a settlement reached at mediation was enforceable. Whether a settlement agreement reached at mediation is ambiguous or not is a question of law subject to de novo review.
At the time of mediation, the parties agreed to the settlement of the workers' compensation case and agreed to sign a "release." When the settlement documents were sent to the claimant for signature, the proposed release prepared by the employer/carrier included a comprehensive release covering not only workers' compensation claims but also a wide array of other potential claims under state and federal law. The claimant refused to sign the release. The employer/carrier filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. The judge determined that the mediation agreement was "clear, unambiguous, and enforceable" and entered an order enforcing the agreement. In doing so and in making determinations, the judge refused to consider the settlement paperwork based on the parol evidence rule determining that such rule precluded the consideration of such extrinsic evidence not contained in the settlement documents.
On appeal, judge's decision reversed. The term "release" referred to at the time of the mediation settlement agreement gave rise to a latent ambiguity, making consideration of extrinsic evidence appropriate. A latent ambiguity (as distinct from a patent ambiguity) arises when the language employed in a settlement document is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings. Release in this instance could have related only to a workers' compensation claim but also to all claims possible that the claimant might have against the employer. Accordingly, extrinsic evidence was needed to make a determination as to the intent of the parties in entering into the settlement agreement.
The entry of an order approving a settlement agreement does not, as a matter of law, extinguish the JCC's jurisdiction over ancillary liens or claims for attorney's fees and costs. Court cited other instances where JCC retained jurisdiction over the case even though a settlement was approved.
At private mediation, the claimant, represented by counsel, and the employer/carrier representative signed a settlement agreement which was subsequently approved by the JCC. Thereafter, the claimant filed a Motion to Vacate or Set Aside the settlement agreement on the grounds that he had an unknown injury that was not within the contemplation of the parties when the case was settled. Court determined that settlement should not be set aside. A settlement of a claim may not be set aside based on a mistake of fact when the claimant's known injury proves to be more serious than was anticipated by the parties at the time the settlement was executed. Cases settled at mediation are especially unsuited for the liberal application of a rule allowing for the recision of a settlement agreement based on a unilateral mistake.
JCC awarded the claimant temporary partial disability benefits not to exceed the statutory maximum of 104 weeks. The parties had previously reached a mediation agreement wherein it was agreed that the claimant would receive $7,750 in full and final satisfaction of all past indemnity benefits through the date of the agreement. The JCC found that the employer/carrier had paid 66 weeks of temporary indemnity but there was no finding as to whether the parties' mediation agreement encompassed these 66 weeks. Because the JCC had failed to determine the number of weeks of temporary partial disability benefits for which the employer/carrier remains liable, order reversed. On remand, the JCC was required to determine the number of benefits left to be paid by the employer/carrier.
The settlement documents between the claimant and the employer/carrier stated that "this agreement shall have no force and effect and shall be fully voidable by either party until such time that the JCC enters an order approving the attorney's fee and child support arrearage allocation." Before the order was entered, the claimant rejected the settlement. JCC erred in finding that the parties had reached an agreement/settlement.
Settlement agreement specifically stated that the claimant could revoke the agreement within seven days following the date of the execution of the agreement. Claimant expressly rejected the settlement prior to executing the settlement documents. Court determined that JCC erred in entering an order enforcing agreement.
Claimant’s prior attorney that had filed a petition on behalf of claimant filed a lien for claimed attorney’s fees following the filing of a substitution of counsel motion. JCC required prior attorney to file a verified petition for fees which was objected to by prior counsel alleging that JCC did not have jurisdiction to require the filing of a verified petition prior to the settlement of the claimant’s claim for benefits. On appeal, order requiring the filing of a verified petition deemed error.
A fee lien does not become ripe for adjudication until a settlement creates proceeds upon which the lien could attach. The charging of a lien represents a right held by an attorney rather than one that must be asserted by the claimant. A lien is an equitable right that generally lasts until the property (here the settlement of the claimant’s claim) is created at which time the attorney can proceed to enforce the lien. Once a case settles and the prior attorney is notified of the settlement, the attorney’s failure to institute an action in a timely fashion can result in dismissal of a lien. JCC erred in this instance by dismissing the lien prior to settlement. The JCC does not have authority to require a claimant’s attorney to file a verified petition prior to settlement.
Claimant and employer entered into a mediated settlement agreement whereby claimant settled her workers’ compensation claim. Thereafter, a civil cause of action was filed against the employer alleging an exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Court determined that by entering into the settlement agreement, the claimant/plaintiff made an election of remedies precluding a civil cause of action against employer. Such settlement constituted a conclusion on the merits of the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim and because of her active pursuit of such workers’ compensation claim, she had elected her remedies under the workers’ compensation statute and was thereafter precluded from seeking a civil cause of action against the employer.
Claimant’s attorney represented a claimant at a mediation that resulted in a joint stipulation whereby the employer/carrier agreed to pay certain benefits and jurisdiction was reserved
“for any attorney’s fees due and owing in conjunction with the claim.” No action was taken in regards to the claim for attorney’s fees for a period of approximately two years. Thereafter, employer/carrier filed a Motion to Dismiss all pending claims for attorney’s fees for failure to prosecute. See Section 440.25(4)(i), Florida Statutes. Following the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, claimant’s attorney filed a verified fee petition and affidavit seeking fees pursuant to the stipulation.
JCC erred in dismissing petition for attorney’s fees with prejudice relying on Section 440.25(4)(i), Florida Statutes. Less than one year passed between the time the claimant’s attorney filed his fee petition and the time a hearing was held to address it. The statutory provision related to failure to prosecute does not provide for a dismissal with prejudice. Finally, the stipulation as to retention of jurisdiction on the issues of attorney fees did not constitute a “petition” subject to the provisions of Section 440.25(4)(i), Florida Statutes, allowing for the dismissal.
The employer/carrier also argued that the claimant’s attorney was guilty of laches and therefore was precluded from pursuing the claim for attorney’s fees. Laches is a doctrine asserted as a defense, which requires proof of 1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is being asserted, and 2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. JCC erred in finding that the employer/carrier did not have the burden of proving the two elements of the laches defense and by not determining whether the employer/carrier overcame this burden.
JCC erred in ordering the claimant to execute and submit a completed settlement document. Parties in workers’ compensation cases can reach a valid binding oral settlement but the record must contain some evidence of the terms of the settlement. In this case, the JCC based his order granting the employer/carrier’s motion to enforce settlement entirely upon an unsworn motion filed by the employer/carrier. This does not constitute competent and substantial evidence to support a settlement. Case remanded for further proceedings.
Settlement entered into between employer/carrier and claimant providing for an MSA to be administered by the claimant. A specific amount was to be utilized for seed money to fund the MSA with periodic annual payments as additional funding. According to the agreement, sums allocated for the MSA were final, not subject to change or dependent on the approval of the Center for Medicare and Medicare Services (CMS). If CMS required more money to fund the MSA for future medical expenses, the claimant would be responsible for paying or funding this sum. CMS in fact determined that less money was needed to fund the MSA. The employer/carrier filed a motion to require the claimant to reimburse an alleged overpayment of seed money. JCC granted the motion and claimant appealed.
JCC is authorized to determine whether a valid binding settlement agreement has been reached and if so, to establish its terms. In addition, the JCC has jurisdiction to determine whether a party complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. Interpretation of settlement agreements are governed by contract law. The standard of review with respect to a JCC’s interpretation of a written settlement agreement is de novo.
On appeal, court determined that, in interpreting the settlement terms, the employer/carrier was not entitled to reimbursement for any alleged overpayment. Claimant was solely responsible for administering the MSA and satisfying any requirements of CMS in approving the final MSA terms. The settlement sums designated in the agreement were final, not subject to reallocation and not subject to CMS approval.
Parties entered into a settlement agreement. JCC subsequently entered an order approving attorney fees and in relevant part determined that "the entire settlement shall be subject to penalties and interest if payment is not rendered timely." The settlement agreement between the parties required the claimant to execute a general release and waiver.
Employer/carrier did not timely pay the settlement sum and motion filed by claimant for attorney fees and costs. JCC denied penalties and interest based on the claimant’s failure to timely execute a release which was a condition precedent to the agreement and that payment was not late. From this order, an appeal was taken.
JCC’s order requiring the payment of penalties and interest is final 30 days after mailing of such order unless appealed. Although a JCC may vacate or amend an order not yet final, once an unambiguous order becomes final, the JCC is without jurisdiction to amend, vacate or republish it. The motion to amend the judge’s order requiring the payment of interest and penalties for the late payment of a settlement had become final and not subject to being vacated by the JCC.
Even if the JCC had jurisdiction to vacate the order concerning payment of penalties and interest, res judicata in this instance would preclude such an action in this case. The JCC had ruled that employer/carrier did have notice of the order awarding penalties and interest for the late payment of the settlement sums and that the signing of the general release was not a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the settlement. That order was final and had not been appealed by the employer/carrier.
Section 440.20(11)c, Florida Statutes, precludes a statutory basis for an award of penalties and interest on lump sum settlement such as the claimant’s in this instance. However, the parties are free to negotiate, as a part of a settlement agreement, for payment of increased benefits should the payment of settlement proceeds be late. Payment of attorney’s fees and costs in this instance was based upon the parties’ agreement to such benefits and not the statutory basis for the payment of attorney’s fees and costs.
On Motion for Certification. Original opinion at 34 FLW D134. Motion for Certification denied. Original order clarified. Previous opinion withdrawn and substituted for opinion in this case.
Court Determined that JCC had jurisdiction to review costs to be reimbursed to claimant’s attorney from settlement proceeds. Paralegal time is not a reimbursable cost but is, instead, included within attorney time.
The JCC has the power only as expressly set forth in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and is not given inherent judicial power such as that given to a court of general jurisdiction. A JCC is required to approve any attorney fee paid as a result of a settlement. The JCC shall not approve a lump sum settlement that provides for an attorney’s fee in excess of the fee permitted under Section 440.34, Florida Statutes. Because the JCC is authorized to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the fee is properly payable, there is jurisdiction to determine what claimant’s attorney characterized as costs should have been included in the attorney’s fee in properly approving the fee.
In determining what costs should be reimbursed, Section 57.104, Florida Statutes, must be considered when attorney fees are awarded. A retainer agreement between the attorney and the claimant does not control cost reimbursements and a retainer agreement in a workers’ compensation matter must comply with both Sections 440.34 and 57.104, Florida Statutes. Paralegal fees are compensated within attorney time and therefore does not constitute costs payable to the claimant’s attorney in excss of reasonable attorney fees.
Appellate review to determine if a JCC has subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. Unlike a court of general jurisdiction, a Judge of Compensation Claims does not possess inherent judicial power. Such a judge possesses only the authority expressly set forth in Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
The law in effect on the date of the accident controls an attorney’s fee award in a workers’ compensation matter. Court determined that Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1983), applied in this instance in determining appellate attorney fees.
The appellate court denied claimant’s Motion for an Appellate Attorney’s Fee to be paid pursuant to Section 440.34(5), Florida Statutes. Although such appellate fee was denied, that denial does not bar a separate attorney’s fee agreement pursuant to Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes. The JCC has jurisdiction to approve or disapprove a stipulation between the claimant and his attorney concerning an attorney’s fee in accordance with subsections (1) and (2) of Section 440.34, Florida Statutes. In this case, the JCC had concluded that the stipulated appellate attorney’s fee was unreasonable because the lawyer had already been compensated for the benefits secured. Competent and substantial evidence supported the JCC’s determination that the stipulated fee was unreasonable.
Employer/carrier and claimant negotiated a settlement for $17,500 inclusive of attorney fees and costs. JCC entered an order enforcing the settlement terms. On appeal, claimant’s attorney argued that since the attorney’s fees and costs had not been stipulated to, an "essential term" of the settlement had not been agreed to and accordingly, the settlement agreement was unenforceable. Court, in rejecting the claimant’s attorney’s argument and affirming the judge’s enforcement of the settlement, determined that all essential terms of the settlement had in fact been agreed to. The claimant agreed to pay his attorney for fees and costs and although at the time of the settlement those sums had not been quantified and may have been in dispute, there was no question that the extent of the employer/carrier’s liability had been agreed to. Accordingly, all essential elements of the settlement had been agreed to.
JCC determined that she did not have jurisdiction to determine merits of petition filed by claimant by taking judicial notice of two prior orders entered by previous JCC determining that the case was settled in its entirety. The employer/carrier failed to timely appear in the proceedings before the JCC and the JCC struck the employer/carrier’s defenses. However, the JCC sua sponte raised the issue of settlement and whether she had jurisdiction to adjudicate entitlement to benefits sought in the petition for benefits. JCC determined that she did not have jurisdiction to award benefits to claimant based on two prior orders determining that case had been settled. Writ of mandamus filed in District Court of Appeals compelling the JCC to reopen the case and resolve the claim on its merits. Petition for Mandamus denied by court.
Court determined that mandamus was properly used in this case to test the correctness of the JCC’s determination that she lacked jurisdiction. To show entitlement to a writ of mandamus, the petition must demonstrate a clear legal right, an indisputable legal duty on the part of the respondent, and no other adequate remedy exists. Court determined that the JCC’s lack of jurisdiction is an issue that the JCC could sua sponte raise. Because of the fact that the case had been fully settled and the time for challenging the order settling the case had passed, there was no viable claim over which the JCC could exercise jurisdiction to award additional benefits sought under the settled claim. JCC had authority to investigate whether the claim had been settled pursuant to previous order divesting her of jurisdiction to award additional benefits. Accordingly, there was no viable claim through which the JCC could exercise jurisdiction and writ of mandamus denied. In addition, the claimant had no legal right to additional benefits.
997 So. 2d 1089, 33 FLW S999
Court determined that Article V courts have placed exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for workers’ compensation issues within the jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation system. The JCC has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over disputed workers’ compensation claim matters. This includes the right to vacate or set aside compensation settlement agreement both prior to the 2001 legislation that amended Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, and subsequent thereto. Court determined that if the Legislature had intended for Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, to constitute an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of JCC’s to rule in workers’ compensation matters, he would have so stated in Section 440.11, Florida Statutes.
The 2001 amendments did establish by the plain language and legislative intent of the changes that the JCC is no longer required to approve settlement agreements where the claimant is represented by an attorney. This provision does not in any way address whether our JCC retains jurisdiction to vacate or set aside a settlement of a represented workers’ compensation claimant. Dissenting opinion.
Settlement agreement was contingent on approval of a Medicare set aside arrangement (MSA) by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Because no such approval occurred, the court determined that the claimant could void the settlement. JCC erred in enforcing a mediation settlement agreement.
CMS approval was not necessary to approve the MSA prior to settlement since the claimant was not a Medicare beneficiary, was not expected to be such a beneficiary within 30 months, and the settlement was for less than $250,000. Because of this, the employer/carrier declined to submit the MSA for approval, informed the claimant’s attorney of this development, and forwarded the final settlement release documents for the claimant’s signature. The claimant refused to sign the settlement documents since there was no CMS approval.
In determining the intent of a settlement agreement, appellate review is de novo. A court may look beyond the language of a contract only when the document’s terms are ambiguous. Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law, and review is de novo. Court determined that settlement documents were not ambiguous and since there was no CMS approval, the claimant could void the agreement.
Court determined that Article V courts have placed exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for workers’ compensation issues within the jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation system. The JCC has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over disputed workers’ compensation claim matters. This includes the right to vacate or set aside compensation settlement agreement both prior to the 2001 legislation that amended Section 440.20(11), Florida Statutes, and subsequent thereto. Court determined that if the Legislature had intended for Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, to constitute an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of JCC’s to rule in workers’ compensation matters, he would have so stated in Section 440.11, Florida Statutes.
The 2001 amendments did establish by the plain language and legislative intent of the changes that the JCC is no longer required to approve settlement agreements where the claimant is represented by an attorney. This provision does not in any way address whether our JCC retains jurisdiction to vacate or set aside a settlement of a represented workers’ compensation claimant. Dissenting opinion.
Court affirmed JCC’s order requiring enforcement of settlement agreement between the parties. Claimant asserted that the settlement agreement between the parties did not include a general release. However, court determined that the portion of the settlement (oral) agreed upon between the parties was enforceable and the contention by the claimant that the requirement to sign a general release was a mere counter-offer was not accepted by the court. The JCC is authorized to determine whether a valid binding settlement agreement was reached and, if so, to establish the terms. The existence of a settlement agreement is a fact question within the JCC’s discretion and such determinations are reviewed based on whether there is competent and substantial evidence that supports the judge’s determination. No general release as discussed in the oral settlement agreements and the terms of the release were not a part of the overall settlement agreed to between the parties.
Parties entered into a settlement agreement contingent upon employer/carrier approval. Prior to employer/carrier approval, the claimant decided not to settle. Thereafter, employer/carrier approved settlement and filed motion to enforce the settlement asserting that the agreement was enforceable since the contingency for settlement was not mutual but rather only based upon the approval of the employer/carrier.
Interpretation of settlement agreements is governed by contract law and whether an agreement constitutes a valid contract is a matter of law subject to de novo review. Conditioning a contract upon approval by one of the parties shows that a binding contract has not yet been formed. Section 440.25(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), provides in part that if both parties agree, the results of a mediation conference are binding and neither party has the right to appeal the results. The mediation report in this instance indicated that both parties had not agreed to the settlement. The employer/carrier attended the mediation without full authority to settle since settlement was effectuated pending actual acceptance of the offer by the employer/carrier. The claimant was permitted to revoke the offer before it was accepted.
The claimant was not represented by an attorney when he signed a settlement release. The JCC did not have jurisdiction to rescind the agreement under Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, since it was undisputed that the claimant was not represented by counsel when he signed the release. The JCC had jurisdiction to determine whether the parties entered into a valid binding settlement agreement. Absent compliance with Section 440.20(11), any agreement by the claimant to waive his rights to workers’ compensation benefits was invalid. Court reversed final summary order dismissing the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim.
Claimant settled his workers’ compensation claim and executed a resignation agreement and waiver and release. (Release) Court determined that by signing the release, this effectively precluded the claimant from filing a civil cause of action. As a part of the settlement agreement, the claimant had released "affiliates" of the employer. Court determined that defendant in civil cause of action qualified as an "affiliate" and accordingly, the civil case of claimant had been effectively released by the workers’ compensation settlement documents. The validity and effect of a settlement and release are governed by contract law. Dissenting opinion.
JCC erred in determining that she did not have jurisdiction to construe the parties’ settlement agreement for purposes of ruling on the claimant’s attorney’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. A dispute arose between the parties in construing a settlement agreement as to whether certain medical bills should be paid pursuant to a Medicare Set Aside Trust that was a part of the settlement agreement. Nothing in the settlement agreement precluded the Judge of Compensation Claims from determining whether its terms required the employer/carrier to pay amounts that Medicare sought from the claimant and thus whether the employer/carrier failed to abide by the settlement agreement. Because of this error, case remanded to JCC to determine the validity of the claimant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees.
Because the parties entered into a stipulated settlement agreement which acknowledged that all issues had been resolved except as to the amount of attorney’s fees and costs, this appeal seeking review of an earlier non-final ruling which denied a fraud defense was dismissed.
Claimant was employed by a health service supply company to perform manual labor for various companies. He would report to the health services company and would be assigned to different employers to perform actual job responsibilities. He was instructed, supervised and controlled by the hiring company. The health supply services company retained the exclusive right to fire the claimant and was responsible for paying him at the end of the work day. Claimant was injured while working for employer to whom he was assigned by the health supply services company. Cause of action brought against employer where he was working at the time of accident. Workers’ compensation benefits obtained from health supply service company.
Workers’ compensation exclusive remedy precluded cause of action against hiring company. See Section 440.11(2), Florida Statutes. Workers’ compensation immunity to an employer is extended to those who use employees of a health supply services company. Employee leasing companies, temporary health services, and labor pools are health supply companies for purposes of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Court determined also that the intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation immunity did not apply in this case. Court pointed out that Florida adheres to an interpretation of the Workers’ Compensation Act that broadly preserves immunity even in the face of sometimes egregious acts by employers and managers. Citing the case of Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683, court determined that lower court had properly instructed the jury in regards to this exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine.
Lower court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a co-defendant’s settlement in cause of action. Section 90.408, Florida Statutes, excludes evidence of a settlement to prove liability; courts may, however, admit evidence of a settlement if offered for other purposes, such as proving witness bias or prejudice. A witness’s bias or improper motive is always an important factor for credibility determinations.
Claimant settled his workers’ compensation case and thereafter filed civil cause of action against employer. The question in this case was whether the claimant had elected his remedies under the workers’ compensation statute to the exclusion of a civil claim.
In citing the case of Jones v. Martin Electronics, Inc., 932 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006), the court determined that there was no election of remedies since there was no conscious intent on the part of the claimant to choose to receive workers’ compensation benefits and reject awardable damages in a potential tort claim. Even though there was a stipulation in the settlement agreement that the claimant suffered a compensable injury, this did not constitute a knowing waiver of the claimant’s common law rights of a civil cause of action against the employer. In addition, the claimant did not pursue the workers’ compensation claim to a conclusion on the merits. The workers’ compensation release specifically stated that the settlement was not to be construed as an election of remedies and that the claimant was reserving his rights to a civil tort claim. The settlement did not say that the disputed issues in the workers’ compensation proceedings had been determined on the merits.
Even though the workers’ compensation settlement did not preclude a civil cause of action, and the claimant did not make an election of remedies, the claimant having accepted benefits from the workers’ compensation carrier is not entitled to an impermissible double recovery for the same damages. See Section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes.
Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, provides that when compensation payable under a workers’ compensation "award" is not paid within seven days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation a penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent thereof. In regards to unrepresented claimants who settle their workers’ compensation cases but the settlement amount is not paid timely, an additional 20 percent penalty is added to the settlement value in accordance with Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes. However, if the claimant is represented by an attorney and there is a late payment of an agreed upon settlement amount, penalties are not payable pursuant to Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes.
When testing the constitutionality of a statutory provision in regards to disparate treatment among classes (in this instance between represented and unrepresented claimants) and assuming that such disparate treatment does not negatively impact a suspect class or result in the deprivation of a fundamental right, the basis of review is whether there is a rational basis for such treatment. Under this minimal level of scrutiny, the party attacking the constitutionality of the statutory provision bears the burden of demonstrating that the statutory distinction at issue has no rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The party defending the constitutionality of the statutory provision has no obligation to prove that the legislature’s assumptions about the benefits of the statutory distinction at issue would be realized nor does such evidence have to be present in the record for the legislation to survive the challenge. Even if it appears that the legislature has made an improvident, ill-advised, or unnecessary decision, the law must be upheld if there are any facts that may reasonably be conceived to justify it. A determination of whether a rational basis exists is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. In this case, the court found a rational basis upon which to distinguish disparate treatment of represented and unrepresented claimants.
When a represented claimant enters into a lump sum settlement with an employer and carrier, Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes (2006) only requires JCC approval of the attorney’s fees paid by the claimant to the claimant’s attorney. A JCC lacks statutory authority to deny the attorney’s fees based upon costs charged to the claimant.
JCC entered order enforcing settlement and directed the parties to submit washout papers with the JCC within ten days of the date of the order. Settlement documents completed and approved by JCC. Employer/carrier mailed checks to claimant which were negotiated. Thereafter, claimant filed an appeal from the order of the judge enforcing the settlement agreement.
On a motion for a suggestion of mootness, the appellate court dismissed the appeal as moot. When a party recovers a judgment and accepts the benefits thereof, he is, on appeal, estopped to seek reversal of that judgment.
Plaintiff law firm represented claimant in workers’ compensation case but was subsequently discharged by injured worker. Successor counsel obtained by claimant. Initial attorney firm charged and retained a lien in the workers’ compensation action for payment of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, case settled by the successor counsel. Plaintiff attorney firm brought cause of action in circuit court for breach of contract seeking payment of attorney’s fees. Court determined that JCC had exclusive jurisdiction to determine fees payable to the initial firm representing the claimant and entered an order dismissing circuit court action because of a lack of jurisdiction. Affirmed on appeal.
929 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
Circuit court erred in treating a theoretically possible settlement of the husband
Writ of prohibition filed asserting that the JCC had abandoned the role of neutral arbiter in a hearing to set the amount of attorney’s fee to be awarded to claimant’s counsel. Specifically, the claimant’s attorney complained that the JCC questioned the claimant about the fee award during a hearing to determine if a settlement was in the claimant’s best interest. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition denied. The inquiries made by the JCC in questioning the reasonableness of a settlement for the claimant fell within that allowed by statute. See also Watson v. Waste Management, 949 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2007).
31 FLW D2915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
Claimant suffered accident on the job and filed several petitions for workers’ compensation benefits. Thereafter, a controversy occurred between employer and claimant in regards to a non-workers’ compensation matter which ultimately was settled with the claimant signing a broad general release. Court determined that the release had the effect of settling the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim without any action by the JCC in the workers’ compensation forum. Claimant failed to discuss this unrelated matter with his workers’ compensation attorney but the court concluded that the claimant was placed in the category of a "represented" claimant for purposes of settling the case without the need for a hearing or judge’s approval.
31 FLW D2915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
Claimant suffered accident on the job and filed several petitions for workers’ compensation benefits. Thereafter, a controversy occurred between employer and claimant in regards to a non-workers’ compensation matter which ultimately was settled with the claimant signing a broad general release. Court determined that the release had the effect of settling the claimant’s workers’ compensation claim without any action by the JCC in the workers’ compensation forum. Claimant failed to discuss this unrelated matter with his workers’ compensation attorney but the court concluded that the claimant was placed in the category of a "represented" claimant for purposes of settling the case without the need for a hearing or judge’s approval.
Claimant and employer/carrier entered into a settlement agreement whereby claimant was to be paid $9,000 and the claimant would pay his attorney $1,600. In addition, there was a side stipulation that the employer/carrier would pay the claimant's attorney an additional $4,000 fee. Court determined that JCC did not err in entering an order approving the attorney's fee to be paid by claimant but not addressing the additional fee to be paid by the employer/carrier. Under Section 440.10(11)(c), Florida Statutes, the settlement agreement requires approval by the JCC only as to the attorney's fees paid to the claimant's attorney by the claimant.
Parties settled case and benefits paid to claimant notwithstanding a fraud defense asserted by employer/carrier. Thereafter, additional petitions filed and employer/carrier defended based on fraud defenses. JCC rejected fraud defenses based on the legal theory of res judicata. On appeal, court reversed judge’s decision determining that res judicata did not apply in this instance.
Res judicata applies to all matters actually raised and determined as well as to all other matters which could properly have been raised and determined in the prior action, whether they were or not. In this case, the employer/carrier did not argue fraudulent misrepresentation prior to the earlier settlement but also that misrepresentations were made after the earlier settlement. Since the fraud defense was based upon facts that allegedly arose after the earlier settlement and concerned new petitions for benefits, the defense was not barred by the earlier settlement.
Deceased claimant and employer/carrier agreed to settle claimant’s workers’ compensation case and claimant agreed to execute a general release and voluntary resignation. The settlement was to be effective and binding upon entry of an order by the JCC approving a motion for attorney’s fees. Prior to claimant executing general release and voluntary resignation, he died. Claimant’s estate sought to enforce settlement terms.
Employer/carrier asserted that a condition precedent or subsequent had not been met to effectuate a binding settlement since the claimant, prior to his death, had not signed the general release and voluntary resignation. Court rejected this argument and enforced settlement agreement. In interpreting the settlement agreement, the court rejected employer/carrier’s position since the settlement agreement made no reference to the settlement being conditioned on the execution of a general release and voluntary resignation. The only condition to the effectiveness of the settlement was that an order be entered approving the motion for attorney’s fees. That order had been entered by the JCC and accordingly, the settlement agreement was fully enforceable. The personal representative’s signing of the general release and voluntary resignation were deemed effective following the death of the claimant.
JCC erred in concluding that she was without jurisdiction to construe the parties’ washout settlement agreement. The settlement agreement unequivocally provided that the settlement payment was in full settlement of any and all claims and that the employer/carrier would be released from liability for all past and future medical bills. Accordingly, the claimant was not entitled to the payment of medical bills that were outstanding at the time the agreement was executed.
JCC erred in finding that the parties had reached a settlement of the workers' compensation issues in question. Evidence reflected that the claimant rejected or repudiated the settlement agreement which was her right pursuant to the terms of the settlement papers submitted by the employer/carrier. A JCC's authority in such situations extends only to a determination of whether parties reached a settlement.
Competent and substantial evidence supported JCC ’s determination that mediation settlement agreement was intended as a full settlement of case and accordingly, the settlement agreement was enforceable. The JCC only enforced the terms of the mediation settlement agreement and nothing else. Compare Hale v. Shear Express, Inc., d/b/a Hair Express, 31 FLW D1666, in which the court found that the parties had never reached an agreement on all essential terms of the settlement and accordingly, it was error for the JCC to enforce the settlement terms.
Parties entered into a settlement agreement contingent upon both parties approval of a Medicare Set Aside amount for future medical. The settlement was also expressly contingent upon resolution of any Medicare lien that may be determined to exist. Neither of these contingencies came to pass although the proposed settlement agreement contained a recommended figure for the Medicare Set Aside amount. The amount had not been approved by the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services.
Because of the fact that the expressed contingencies as set forth in the settlement agreement had not been satisfied, the JCC refused to enforce the settlement agreement. Competent substantial evidence in the record supported the judge’s finding that the parties intended finality of the settlement agreement to hinge on both approval of the Medicare Set Aside amount by CMMS and the actual resolution of any Medicare liens after the existence and amount thereof had been determined.
JCC determined that a valid settlement agreement had been reached between the parties at the time of mediation. An order was entered ratifying the contract of settlement and directing the claimant to sign the appropriate settlement papers. On appeal, order enforcing the settlement reversed and case remanded for further proceedings. The employer/carrier, as the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement, failed to prove that the claimant’s attorney had clear and unequivocal authority to settle on the claimant’s behalf.
Claimant suffered from a diagnosed hepatitis C condition. Court determined that competent and substantial evidence supported the JCC’s finding that an occupational disease was not proven. The claimant testified that he could not recall any instances of exposure to anyone infected with hepatitis C and there was no evidence that this disease was contracted during the claimant’s employment as a firefighter. Based upon expert medical testimony and records from the Center for Disease Control, the evidence showed that there is no higher incidence of hepatitis C in firefighters than in the general public and that hepatitis C is an ordinary disease of life. Section 112.181, Florida Statutes, did not create the presumption of compensability for this condition in this instance.
In following the decision of Marchenko v. Sunshine Company, 894 So. 2d 311, (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), the court determined that the JCC no longer has jurisdiction to vacate a settlement agreement considering the statutory changes made in 2001 to Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Court determined that the 2001 changes to Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, were procedural or remedial changes that apply without regard to the date of accident.
JCC found that parties intended to settle case when considering the agreement they entered into at the mediation conference. The claimant had agreed to sign "any releases employer/carrier may require". Competent and substantial evidence supported the judge’s decision to enforce agreement. Dissenting opinion.
Claimant filed civil suit against employer and settled the claim executing a "general release with indemnification." Thereafter, a workers’ compensation claim was filed against the employer. Court determined that the general release was broad enough to cover any petitions for workers’ compensation benefits when the settlement agreement stated that the payments therein made were in "full settlement and discharged of all claims which are, or might have been, the subject of the complaint . . . " Dissenting opinion.
Order entered denying certain benefits to the claimant which was thereafter appealed by claimant. While claim was on appeal, additional Petitions for Benefits were filed and a stipulation was entered into resolving those issues and agreeing to the payment of an attorney’s fee for all non-appellate time. Order denying benefits subsequently reversed in part. Claimant’s attorney sought additional attorney’s fees for non-appellate time expended in the prosecution of the claim that was ultimately reversed in part on appeal. Court determined that additional attorney’s fees were not payable based on the stipulation. Court determined that the claimant was bound by the plain language of the stipulation even if it is the result of poor drafting. Dissenting opinion.
JCC properly determined that he did not have jurisdiction to vacate or set aside a settlement agreement reached in accordance with Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes.
Judge of Compensation Claims has jurisdiction to determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. JCC erred in declining to rule on a motion to enforce settlement. Dissenting opinion.
JCC has jurisdiction and authority to determine whether a settlement agreement was reached and if so to establish the terms of the settlement agreement. JCC erred in finding that he lacked jurisdiction to determine whether an enforceable settlement agreement was reached.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Federal court determined that the release language in a workers’ compensation settlement agreement between the employer and employee was not sufficiently clear to absolve the employer of a retaliatory discharge claim where it was not clear from the language of the release whether the employee intended to release his retaliatory discharge claim under Section 440.205, Florida Statutes. Under Florida law, a general release of benefits does not necessarily release a retaliatory discharge claim without evidence of intent by the claimant to do so. The court in this case did not say that a retaliatory discharge claim could never be disposed of through the use of a general settlement agreement in a workers’ compensation context. However, the facts in this case and the general release entered into did not support the ultimate conclusion that the settlement effectively settled the retaliatory discharge claim.
The Judge of Compensation Claims has jurisdiction to determine whether a settlement was reached and to construe or enforce settlement agreements. The amendments to Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes, adopted by the 2000 Legislature did not eliminate the previously existing jurisdiction of the JCC to interpret and enforce such settlement agreements. The parties had entered into a settlement agreement but before the payout of the settlement, the claimant died. JCC erred in determining that she did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement between the parties. See also Gerow v. Yesterday’s, 881 So.2d 94.
Claimant ’s attorney withdrew from the representation of the claimant and filed a Notice of Lien for attorney’s fees. Thereafter, the employer/carrier settled case with claimant. There was some question as to whether the claimant’s former attorney had been notified of the settlement. Subsequently, the JCC dismissed the claimant’s former attorney’s lien for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 4.075(e), Florida Rules of Workers’ Compensation Procedures. Court ruled that the attorney’s fee/cost lien filed is not subject to Rule 4.075(e).
The perfection of a charging lien requires only timely notice to the effected parties. The employer/carrier, as well as their attorney, had notice of the attorney’s charging lien at the time of the settlement and therefore had an affirmative obligation to inform the claimant’s attorney of the settlement stipulation. Since there was a dispute as to whether the claimant’s former attorney had notice of the settlement, case remanded for evidentiary hearing to make this determination.
Although the failure to prosecute provisions of the rule have no applicability in defending the assertion of an attorney’s fee lien, Laches may be applicable. The Doctrine of Laches requires proof of 1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted; and 2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.
Claimant, while represented by an attorney, entered into a settlement agreement with her employer. The JCC entered an order approving the attorney
Whenever the purpose of a diagnostic test is to determine the cause of the claimant’s symptoms, which symptoms may be related to a compensable accident, the cost of the diagnostic test is compensable, even if it should later be determined that the claimant suffered from both compensable and non-compensable conditions.
Court reversed JCC's order directing the employer to pay permanent total disability supplemental benefits together with interest and penalties thereon. At the time of the settlement agreement between the parties, the Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, not the employer, was responsible for the payment of supplemental benefits. Distinguishing the case of Platt v. R.C. Prop., 573 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), there was nothing in the agreement between the parties that might fairly be read as an election by the employer to pay such benefits directly to the claimant.
Claimant sought to overcome settlement agreement previously agreed to between the parties alleging that the employer/carrier concealed his psychiatric conditions from the JCC when the settlement was approved and/or that there was a mistake of fact regarding his condition when the settlement was entered into between the parties. (In two separate orders, the claimant settled his compensation and medical.) JCC denied attempt to set aside settlement based on the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, order reversed. Court determined that JCC should have made factual determinations as to the applicability of the doctrine and whether application of the doctrine would result in an injustice. The doctrine should not be applied in cases where it would result in an injustice.
In accordance with Section 440.20(11)c, a lump sum settlement amount must be paid within 14 days after the date the Judge of Compensation Claims mails the order approving the attorney's fees. The JCC has the authority and jurisdiction to impose sanctions for a late payment of a settlement reached pursuant to this section. However, sanctions can be implemented only upon a showing of willfulness. The denial of sanctions by the JCC affirmed. The JCC determined that the non-payment was not willful. Court ruled that appellant had failed to show that the JCC abused her discretion by this factual determination. Judge's order denying sanctions for the late payment of the settlement proceeds affirmed on appeal.
Court determined that JCC has jurisdiction to enforce an oral settlement agreement entered into pursuant to Section 440.20(11)(c), Florida Statutes. A settlement agreement authorized under Section 440.20(110(c), Florida Statutes, does not have to be in writing in order to be binding and thus enforceable by the JCC. Rule 4.142 requires any agreement, other than those involving Section 440.20(11) to be in writing or dictated on the record to be valid. No documentation needs to be presented to the JCC in support of a settlement except to justify the amount of attorney's fees and the appropriate recovery of any child support arrearage. Opinion withdrawn.
Claimant injured in work related accident and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits against his employer. While represented by an attorney, he formally settled that claim in his workers' compensation proceeding and executed a general release. Court determined that claimant had elected his remedies by affirmatively seeking benefits under the workers' compensation system and accordingly, was precluded in filing a cause of action against his employer in a civil setting for his injuries. However, such an election of remedies had no application to a claim against the employer for spoliation or negligent destruction of evidence. A spoilation claim is an independent cause of action for negligence against the employer. Court also determined that spoilation claim was not settled by the release signed by the claimant.
Plaintiff injured while employed by employer and received workers' compensation benefits. A third party claim was filed against the landlord/owner of the premises where the claimant was injured and based upon an allegation of negligence in maintaining the work premises. A settlement was effectuated with landlord/owner and as part of the settlement, plaintiff obtained from landlord/owner an assignment of any claim that the landlord/owner had against the employer. Plantiff/claimant then filed cause of action against employer based on a contractual indemnification provision between the employer and the landlord/owner of the premises. Equitable subrogation claim against employer denied under this factual scenario. When one of several defendants pays the plaintiff's entire claim that in equity should have been paid by one of the other defendants, a claim for equitable subrogation arises. In this instance, however, the plaintiff had no claim against the employer because of the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statute. Common law indemnification was also denied. To succeed in a claim based on common law indemnity, there must be a showing that: 1) the landlord/owner was without fault and 2) that the landlord/owner's liability for damages to the plaintiff was vicarious only and solely based upon the wrong of the employer. In this case, the landlord/owner was not responsible for damages vicariously. Accordingly, there was no common law indemnification claim. There was no legal relationship between the employer and the landlord/owner which would create any vicarious liability on the part of the landlord/owner. Claim for contractual indemnification in this scenario allowed. Indemnification provision in agreement between landlord/owner and employer provided for indemnification of damages by employer but made no reference to indemnifying the landlord/owner for its own negligence. Summary judgment against the landlord/owner based upon contractual indemnification overturned on appeal since there was a question as to whether the landlord/owner or employer was the negligent party. The court pointed out, however, that Florida courts view with disfavor contracts that attempt to indemnify a party against its own negligence. Dismissal of claim against carrier of employer affirmed based on the contractual indemnification claim. There was a specific exclusion in the insurance policy issued to the employer excluding liability assumed under a contract. Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the insurer for the employer.
814 So.2d 505, 27 FLW D910
Court determined that JCC erred by failing to give effect to a settlement agreement in which there was a stipulation concerning entitlement to an attorney's fee based upon a lump sum settlement. Case remanded to JCC to take additional testimony concerning the amount of the fee and whether it should be based on an hourly rate or on the statutory basis.
807 So.2d 167, 27 FLW D375
Court determined that General Release settling workers' compensation case under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, had the effect of also settling a potential Jones Act case that the claimant might have against the employer. In footnote, court pointed out that workers' compensation benefits received could be a setoff against potential Jones Act damages available but in a release situation, the release signed had the effect of precluding a subsequent Jones Act claim.
799 So.2d 361, 26 FLW D2633
Claimant settled workers' compensation case with medical remaining open. In addition to signing a joint petition settlement agreement, the claimant executed an affidavit in which he acknowledged the settlement agreement and stated that he understood that medical treatment was open so long as he did not allow a period of greater than two years to expire without receiving medical treatment. After the two-year period for receiving medical care ran with no medical cre being provided, the claimant filed a Petition for Rule Nisi to enforce the medical provisions of the settlement agreement that had been approved by order. Court determined that the Rule Nisi order should not have been entered by the lower court and determined that because the claimant executed the affidavit which explicitly described the two-year statute of limitations for receiving medical care, the employer/carrier was not estopped in relying on the statute of limitations defense in denying further medical care. See Gulfstream Press, Inc. v. Acle, 697 So.2d 213 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
794 So.2d 680, 26 FLW D2080
The Judge of Compensation Claims dismissed claimant's petition to set aside a settlement, finding that the petition was not legally sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, court determined that the petition made allegations sufficient to at least warrant a hearing.
798 So.2d 758, 26 FLW D1688
Claim filed for penalties and interest against the Florida Workers' Compensation Insurance Guaranty Association for the untimely payment of settlement proceeds. The employer's insurance carrier had become bankrupt and the claimant had elected to seek benefits from the guaranty fund pursuant to Section 631.929, Florida Statutes. This provision provides that if an injured worker elects to obtain benefits against the guaranty fund under this section, no penalties and interest are payable. As required by Section 440.20(7), settlement proceeds must be payable within seven days after the JCC issues an order approving the settlement, with an additional five days allowed for mailing. Notwithstanding this provision, penalties and interest against the guaranty fund are not payable. The provision precluding the payment of penalties and interest against the guaranty fund also precludes recovery of such benefits from the employer when the claimant has elected to seek benefits from the guaranty fund.
Plaintiff's estate filed civil cause of action against employer. During pendency of civil action, deceased plantiff's estate settled with employer under the Workers' Compensation Act. Defendant/employer took the position that this settlement constituted an election of remedies precluding civil cause of action by estate and children of deceased plaintiff. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, there were no admissions as to compensability of the claim, an employer/employee relationship between the deceased employee and the employer/defendant and whether the accident was in the deceased employee's course and scope of employment. In addition, no guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the children in the settlement. Court determined that settlement in workers' compensation proceeding did not constitute an election of remedies precluding civil liability of employer. Mere acceptance of benefits under the workers' compensation system is not enough to constitute an election of remedies precluding civil cause of action. There was no evidence that claimant's estate had made a conscious intent to elect a workers' compensation remedy and to waive civil causes of action against the employer. Because the workers' compensation remedy was not pursued to a determination or conclusion on the merits, there was no election of remedies. The employer simply opted to "buy" its way out of the workers' compensation litigation by resolving the amount claimed in an amount of little more than a nuisance claim. In addition, there was nothing in the joint petition settlement agreement that paid any benefits to the deceased employee/plaintiff's children. The children's names were mentioned in the joint petition settlement agreement but the actual stipulation only related to the claimant of the surviving spouse of the deceased plaintiff.
Joint Petition Settlement Agreement provided for a lump sum payment to the claimant inclusive of an attorney's fee. In addition, the Joint Petition provided for the payment of a previously contested medical bill with reservation of jurisdiction to determine entitlement to attorney's fees for past services outside fees awarded pursuant to the lump sum payment. JCC erred in denying attorney's fee for obtaining payment of previously contested medical bill on the ground that all fees were included in the lump sum payment. The Joint Petition specifically said that jurisdiction was being reserved by the Judge of Compensation Claims to determine attorney's fees for past services rendered.
Deceased employee's spouse settled workers' compensation claim pursuant to Joint Petition and thereafter filed civil cause of action against employer. Employer asserted that the settlement of the workers' compensation case constitued an election of remedies thereby precluding a civil cause of action against the employer. The mere acceptance by the claimant of compensation benefits under the workers' compensation system is not enough to constitute an election of remedies. There must be evidence of a conscious intent by the claimant to elect the workers' compensation remedy and to waive any other rights. Court determined that mere acceptance of a settlement in this instance did not constitute an election of remedies. There was no adjudication as to whether the deceased employee was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death. In addition, the stipulation in the workers' compensation setting did not include the children of the deceased employee and there was no evidence that they had elected any remedy under the workers' compensation system. Court determined that in order to effectuate a workers' compensation settlement for minor children, a legal guardianship was required pursuant to Section 744.387, Florida Statutes (1995). Since this was not done, there could be no settlement of a workers' compensation claim brought by the minor children.
Claimant injured in compensable accident. As a part of ongoing medical care, employer/carrier paid in advance for the claimant to attend a weight loss program provided by Nutri/Systems. Case settled and two months after the settlement, Nutri/Systems closed its facilities where the claimant lived. Nutri/Systems refunded the carrier approximately $2,500 for the unused portion of the weight loss program. Claimant sought payment of the $2,500 that had been sent to the employer/carrier. JCC determined that he did not have jurisdiction to order reimbursement of such funds and on appeal, this decision was reversed. The court required the employer/carrier to reimburse the claimant the balance for the weight loss program because the settlement only settled the future liability of the employer/carrier and had no effect on monies that had previously been committed to provide treatment to the claimant.
Injured worker settled workers' compensation claim and invested settlement proceeds in certificate of deposit. Thereafter, claimant pledged CD as security for a loan from bank. Claimant asserted that CD was exempt from claim of creditor bank pursuant to Section 440.22, Florida Statutes and the case of Broward v. Jacksonville Medical Center, 690 So.2d 589 which extended the exemption of Section 440.22 to traceable proceeds of a workers' compensation settlement in a bank account. Court determined, however, that Broward did not apply because in that case, the judgment debtor had not been specifically granted an interest in the bank account as the bank had in this instance. Claimant, in this instance, had specifically pledged the proceeds of the settlement after they had been received. Court determined that once workers' compensation benefits had been received by a beneficiary, no statutory restrictions apply to the use of those benefits by the beneficiary. This control includes the ability to pledge the funds as collateral for a loan after the funds had been received.
Dissenting opinion. Parties entered into standard Joint Petition Settlement Agreement in which claimant settled all claims against employer. After workers' compensation case settled, claimant bought a wrongful discharge action against employer pursuant to Section 440.201, Florida Statutes. Majority opinion determined that exculpatory language of standard JP had the effect of precluding the wrongful discharge action. In written opinion, this dissenting judge opined that the general release language of the Joint Petition settling the workers' compensation claim did not have the effect of precluding this wrongful discharge case. There was no separate consideration for this release and the JCC did not have jurisdiction to settle the wrongful termination claim.
Claimant and employer/carrier settled workers' compensation claim for indemnity but left open future medical relating to claimant's back injury. A provision in the settlement agreement, however, specifically stated that the claimant waived any right to claim psychiatric care for his on the job accident. At the time of this settlement, the settlement of future medical was not permitted. Court determined that provision waiving the claimant's right to psychiatric care was invalid. However, because of the severability clause in the settlement agreement, the declaring of the waiver of psychiatric care as being invalid did not have the effect of setting aside the entire settlement agreement. In setting aside the entire agreement, the JCC also determined that the claimant, at the time of the settlement, had not reached MMI. Court determined, however, that such a finding could not stand because in making this finding, the JCC relied on the testimony of the claimant, his wife, and claimant's former attorney. None of these individuals were experts qualified to give an opinion on a soft tissue injury. Accordingly, the finding that the claimant had not reached MMI was reversed.
Claimant settled her workers' compensation claim against employer and thereafter filed a civil cause of action against the employer for sexual harassment based upon the same conduct that was the subject of the workers' compensation settlement. Court determined that civil cause of action based upon a sexual harassment claim is independent of a workers' compensation claim involving the same conduct and accordingly, the civil cause of action could proceed notwithstanding the fact that the claimant had settled her workers' compensation claim. The workers' compensation statute is not the exclusive remedy for claims based on sexual harassment in the workplace. See Byrd v. Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc. 552 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1989). The Election of Remedies Doctrine did not prevent the filing of a civil cause of action when the workers' compensation claim had been settled in this instance. The civil cause of action was requesting damages that were not awardable in the workers' compensation system.
Court determined that JCC erred in determining that joint petition settlement agreement by its terms did not find claimant was entitled to continuing medical care for her hypertension and renal insuffiency conditions. Ruling that the stipulation was ambigious, the Judge of Compensation Claims allowed extrensic evidence as to the stipulation's meaning and import. The additional information showed that the parties had intended to leave future medical open for the treatment for these two medical conditions suffered by the claimant.
Claimant suffered questionable workers' compensation accident but thereafter settled with the employer/carrier denying in the Joint Petition Settlement Agreement that a compensable accident had occurred. Thereafter, injured worker sued treating physician in malpractice claim and treating physician filed a Motion for Contribution against the employer as a joint tortfeasor pursuant to the Florida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes. Employer defended on the basis that the claimant, by accepting the settlement of his workers' compensation claim, had elected his remedy under the Florida Workers' Compensation Act and therefore, the exclusive remedy provisions precluded the Claim for Contribution. Court determined that exclusive remedy provisions did not preclude the contribution claim in this instance. Pursuant to the stipulation between the claimant and the employer/carrier, there was an agreement that the accident did not happen within the course and scope of employment. This allegation was made in the contribution claim and since in accordance with this stipulation there was no employment relationship and the accident did not occur within the course and scope of employment, there could be no exclusive remedy protection. The employer/carrier did have the right to plead and prove through an affirmative defense that workers' compensation immunity was applicable even though a contrary stipulation was entered into between the employer/carrier and the claimant. The Doctrine of Election of Remedies only forecloses an employee from later suing an employer in tort after the employee actively pursues and receives workers' compensation benefits. In this case, this doctrine would not apply since it was not the employee seeking a claim but a third party. In addition, the alleged third party tortfeasor was not a party to the workers' compensation proceedings or the settlement agreement which was approved by the JCC. Accordingly, he cannot be bound by nor have his interests affected by what transpired in those proceedings.
JCC erred in interpreting stipulation concerning entitlement to attorney's fee restricting the amount of attorney fees to benefits paid in the past as opposed to including future increases in attendant care. The original stipulation between the parties expressly contemplated modifications in the need for future attendant care and the attorney's fee payable for the obtaining of attendant care in the future remained an issue to be determined. Case certified to Supreme Court concerning whether interest is payable on an attorney's fee when entitlement is established or when the actual amount of the fee is determined.
Agency for Health Care Administration sought to recover from claimant's settlement of workers' compensation case Medicaid benefits paid. Lower court determined that the workers' compensation settlement proceeds received by the claimant did not include any expenses which had been paid by Medicaid and accordingly, denied the petition to enforce a Medicaid lien. Court determined on appeal that the trial court's order denying the Medicaid lien came to the appellate court with a presumption of correctness and there was no evidence in the record which would suggest that the trial court's determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court's determination affirmed.
Claimant settled case with employer/carrier and deposited settlement proceeds into a bank account. The question in this case is whether the bank account with the settlement proceeds is immune from claims of creditors of the injured worker pursuant to Section 440.22, Florida Statutes. Supreme Court ruled that Section 440.22 does protect such benefits against claims of creditors so long as the funds are traceable to the workers' compensation benefits paid. Section 440.22 prevents beneficiaries of workers' compensation benefits from assigning the benefits before they are received and protects such beneficiaries from claims of creditors after they have been received.
Parties settled case and agreed settlement benefits would be paid within 14 days of "the date of entry of the order." Check not mailed to claimant within 14 days of the judge's signature on the order approving the settlement. However, it was mailed to the claimant timely if the 5 additional days for mailing referenced in Rule 4.030(c), Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure were considered. Court ruled in Palm Beach County School Board v. Miller-Neal, 674 So. 2d 759 (1st DCA 1996) that 5 additional days are added for mailing to determine timely payment of a settlement which stated that benefits were due in a certain period "after it becomes due." Payment becomes due under the Miller-Neal decision by adding 5 days for mailing from the date the judge mails the order approving the settlement. However, the parties in this case agreed that payment would be due within a time frame from the date of the entry of the order which distinguished this case from the Miller-Neal decision. Since the settlement amount was not timely paid to the claimant, penalties deemed to be due to claimant. Dissenting opinion.
Claimant and employer/carrier settled case. The joint petition settlement documents stipulated to a maximum medical improvement date. More than two years after the stipulated MMI date, claim was filed by employer/carrier against the Special Disability Trust Fund. Section 440.49(2)(g), Florida Statutes (1987), states that written notice of a claim to the fund must be made within two years after the date the employee reached MMI. Because of the fact that the notice of claim against the fund was not filed within two years of the stipulated MMI date, court determined that notice to the fund was untimely and reimbursement from the fund was denied.
Workers' compensation case settled and proceeds deposited into a bank account. Court determined that this bank account was not exempt from claims of a judgment creditor pursuant to Section 440.22, Florida Statutes.
Parties entered into a joint petition settlement agreement which was approved by JCC. Payment of settlement was made by employer/carrier twelve days after order entered. The question in this case is whether the payment of the settlement was late and claimant was entitled to penalties pursuant to the terms of Section 440.20(7), Florida Statutes. Following entry of an order approving a washout settlement, the date that the order is mailed to the parties (rather than the date it is entered) controls in determining the time frame for payment of the settlement amount to the claimant. Payment is deemed to be made on the date that the employer/carrier mails the check to the claimant or his attorney. Court determined that in following Rule 40.030(c), Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, payment to the claimant becomes due five days after the order approving the washout settlement was mailed to the parties. Five days after the order is entered, the employer/carrier then has up to seven days to make a payment to the claimant or incur a mandatory penalty. Court determined in this case that payment was timely made and penalties denied.
The Judge of Compensation Claim does not have the authority to approve a lump sum settlement payable to the claimant and require the Special Disability Trust Fund to pay the claimant directly. The fund was designed to reimburse employer/carriers who meet the requirements of Section 440.49. An employee does not have any right to receive payments from the fund.
Claimant suffered two injuries while employed by the same employer. The two injuries were covered by different insurance carriers. Claimant settled second accident and in the joint petition stipulation agreed that as a result of the second accident, a permanent injury resulted. Thereafter, a claim for benefits was filed against the first carrier for the first accident and in the new claim for benefits, the claimant took the position that the second accident was only a temporary exacerbation of the first accident. Court determined that because of the joint petition stipulations, the claimant was precluded from taking the position that she did not suffer a permanent injury from the second accident in an attempt to seek further wage loss benefits from the employer and carrier for the first accident.
(On Motion for Rehearing) Court reaffirmed earlier decision that the claimant was estopped in claiming rehabilitation benefits when the case was previously settled by joint petition and the JP signed by the parties specifically stated that rehabilitation benefits were being settled. Court determined that claimant in claiming rehabilitation benefits was not seeking to overturn the previously agreed upon JP but rather seeking to retain the benefits in the JP and secure additional benefits.
Claimant and employer/carrier entered into a settlement agreement settling all compensation but leaving future medical open. As a part of the agreement, rehabilitation temporary total benefits were settled. Court determined that Section 440.20(12)(a) precludes the settlement of temporary total rehabilitation benefits payable by the employer/carrier. However, the court ruled that the claimant was estopped by the plain language of the settlement agreement from claiming additional temporary total rehabilitation benefits, i.e., the Joint Petition Settlement Agreement specifically stated that rehabilitation temporary total benefits were being settled. Dissenting opinion.
Judge erred in awarding benefits to claimant after setting aside joint petition settlement agreement. The scope of the hearing was limited to setting aside the joint petition and not to the award of benefits.
643 So.2d 602, 19 FLW D1956
Claimant suffered two injuries, the first having been settled. Medical testimony indicated that claimant did not suffer permanent injury from second accident. Court determined that judge erred in finding permanency associated with second accident. The claimant's testimony of his increased pain and restricted activity after second accident was insufficient to support a finding of increased disability attributable to the second accident. The claimant's injury was a low back condition which was not readily observable or subject to evaluation by lay persons. After MMI from second injury with a finding of no permanency, first carrier responsible for the payment of claimant's orthopedic care.
Employer/carrier and claimant's attorney agreed on settlement of claimant's claim for benefits. Six days prior to the approval of the JP by the JCC, the claimant was admitted to the hospital for an attempted suicide. This fact was brought to the attention of the adjuster for the employer/carrier and the claimant's attorney. However, neither the JCC nor the attorney for the employer/carrier was advised of this hospitalization. JCC's setting aside of settlement affirmed on appeal. Court determined that claimant's psychiatric condition was a material factor to be considered in evaluating the settlement proposal and the judge's ignorance of this information prevented him from discharging his duties under the statute. Accordingly, the settlement was overturned. Court affirmed JCC's opinion as to the causal connection between the claimant's psychiatric condition and accident. The medical evidence upon which the judge relied was by deposition. Even though the appellate court under these circumstances can make an independent evaluation of the evidence, the case will not be retried on appeal and the resolution of conflicts in the evidence is within the fact finding authority of the JCC. While differing conclusions might arguably be reached by selectively emphasizing and giving greater weight to portions of the testimony of the depositions of the physicians, such a process is part and parcel to the fact finding function of the JCC and the appellate court will not disturb such findings by the JCC. The claimant had severe preexisting psychiatric disorders. Relying on the opinion of Ackley v. General Parcel Service, 646 So.2d 242, the court determined that the compensable accident was a stressor in the resulting psychiatric problems suffered by the claimant and accordingly, there was a causal connection between the injury and the resulting psychiatric condition.
652 So.2d 985, 20 FLW D833
Joint Petition Settlement Agreement stipulated that all required remedial care had been furnished. Claim filed for attendant care from date of maximum medical improvement to the date of the lump sum settlement agreement. Court determined that the stipulation to the effect that all required remedial care had been furnished had no bearing on entitlement to attendant care benefits which were palliative rather than remedial in nature. Attendant care awardable for periods following MMI up to the date of the approval of the settlement agrement.
Effective January 1, 1994, penalties are payable if an order is not paid within 7 days as opposed to the previous statutory provision allowing for a 30 day payment period. Employer/carrier did not pay settlement within 7 days of order of judge approving joint petition settlement agreement. Even though accident occurred prior to January 1 of 1994, the court found that the statutory change was remedial and accordingly, applied regardless of the date of accident. In such circumstances, the court found that the award of penalties is mandatory and the judge erred in not awarding such.
650 So.2d 1036, 20 FLW D370
Construction of a washout settlement agreement like any other contract is a question of law. However, if the terms of the agreement are susceptible to more than one construction, then an issue of fact is presented. In cases in which such a factual issue is presented, the JCC must make the initial determination as to the intended effect of the settlement. Settlement agreement in this instance made reference only to one date of accident and not to another. The question in this case was whether the non-referenced date of accident was deemed to have been settled in the settlement agreement. The joint petition settlement agreement provision to the effect that the claimant settled all known claims did not have the effect of settling an unmentioned date of accident as a matter of law. The interpretation of the settlement agreement presented a question of fact because of discrepancies within the settlement agreement itself as to whether all injuries other than those mentioned in the joint petition settlement agreement were contained in the settlement agreement. Case remanded with instructions to obtain evidence from the parties to determine the intended scope of the settlement agreement and whether the date of accident not mentioned in the settlement agreement had been settled.
648 So.2d 787, 20 FLW D161
The construction of a washout settlement agreement is generally a question of law, unless its terms are susceptible to more than one construction, in which case a factual issue is presented regarding the intended effect of the settlement. The JCC in the present case erred as a matter of law in determining that the settlement agreement was susceptible to more than one interpretation and that the agreement precluded the claimant from seeking medical care. The JCC's determination that the claimant did not understand the settlement agreement, even if correct, is not determinative of the issue, especially considering the terms of the joint petition and supporting affidavit and the fact that the claimant was represented by an attorney at the time.
645 So.2d 133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
Claimant filed claim for workers' compensation benefits claiming an employer/employee relationship. JCC ruled against claimant and while the case was on appeal, the claimant elected to settle his case for a lump sum payment from the employer/carrier. Thereafter, a civil cause of action was filed against the general contractor of the claimant's employer. Court ruled that by entering into the lump sum stipulation, the claimant had elected his remedy and therefore, was precluded from filing a civil cause of action against his employer's general contractor. When the injured party actively pursues and receives workers' compensation benefits, an election of remedies precludes the filing of a civil cause of action. On the other hand, where the injured party does not actively pursue such benefits, a factual determination is warranted regarding whether the injury was within the scope of employment and the claimant can file a civil cause of action against the employer.
18 FLW D2105, September 22, 1993 (2nd DCA)
Claimant settled workers' compensation by joint petition agreement. Court determined that employer was not responsible for any alleged acts of violating Section 440.205, F.S., for activities prior to the signing of the joint petition agreement. There was an allegation of wrongful discharge subsequent to the joint petition settlement agreement and court ruled that the joint petition did not preclude such a wrongful termination cause of action. The settlement and release of the workers' compensation claim would not barr an action for subsequent wrongful termination alleged to be the result of the workers' compensation claim. The release was valid only to claims which had matured at the time of the execution of the release.
18 FLW D2090, September 17, 1993
Claimant sustained two accidents while employed by two different carriers, the combination of the two causing the claimant to be PT. Second accident settled for $125,000 and claimant sought recovery for PT benefits against employer/carrier for first accident. In determining whether a washout of second accident precluded recovery for additional benefits from first accident, the question involves the construction of the washout settlement agreement and is a question of law. If the terms of the agreement are susceptibleto more than one construction, however, an issue of fact is presented. In cases when such a fact issue is presented, the JCC must make the initial determination as to the intended effect of the settlement. Case remanded to JCC with instructions to determine the intended effect of the settlement of the second accident.It was error to require the employer/carrier to pay PT supplemental benefits for accidents before July 1, 1984. These benefits should be paid by the Workers' Compensation Administrative Trust Fund.
18 FLW D1537, July 2, 1993
Attorney's fees reimbursable by Special Disability Trust Fund from settlement proceeds between claimant and employer/carrier. Case settled for $200,000.00 and under the terms of the Joint Petition Settlement Agreement, the claimant was to pay his own attorney's fees. Court determined that these attorney's fees were reimbursable by the Special Disability Trust Fund.
18 FLW D832, March 22, 1993
Carrier settled with injured worker and thereafter sought recovery from the Special Disability Trust Fund for the amounts paid. Part of the sum that was paid to the claimant was for attorney's fees. According to the settlement stipulation, the claimant was paying for the attorney's fees and there was no obligation on the part of the carrier to pay for the services of the claimant's attorney. Even though separate checks were issued by the carrier to the claimant and his attorney, court determined that the amount paid for attorney's fees is still recoverable from the Special Disability Trust Fund upon a showing of a proper basis for Fund recovery. In this case, there was no hint of collusion between the carrier and the claimant and it was stipulated that the carrier has no responsibility for the payment of attorney's fees.
605 So.2d 134, 17 FLW D2019, August 28, 1992
Claimant injured in two accidents and settled with carrier for second accident. The question in this case is whether the carrier for the second accident has a right of contribution from carrier of first accident for reimbursement in regards to the amounts paid in the settlement and whether the claimant still had the right to pursue benefits under the first accident. In resolving this question, it involves interpreting the scope of settlement between the claimant and the carrier for the second accident. Court determined that settlement in this case was unclear. Settlement in this case released not only the carrier from the second accident but the employer. There was no apportionment prior to the settlement to indicate that the carrier for the second accident was responsible for anything less than 100% of the total benefits claimed. These factors indicate the settlement was intended to be a full settlement of all benefits due. Case remanded for an interpretation as to the meaning of the settlement agreement.
596 So.2d 809, 17 Fla. L. Week. D959, Fla.App. 1 Dist., Apr 13, 1992
Employer/carrier and claimant entered into settlement and joint petition was submitted to judge for his approval. Prior to judge's approval of JP, claimant died. Thereafter, order entered by judge approving settlement. Court affirmed judge's setting aside of order approving settlement. Claimant's death prior to judge's approval of settlement agreement was a material fact unknown to the judge at time of agreement and essential to the judge's consideration of the agreement. Since judge did not know of claimant's death, it was proper to set aside the settlement agreement.A settlement agreement is not final and enforceable until it is approved by the Judge of Compensation Claims. The responsibility of the judge in considering a settlement agreement is not to perform a perfunctory mechanical act. Rather, Section 440.20(12), Florida Statutes, requires the judge to perform several acts prior to approving a lump sum settlement agreement, including reviewing the Division file, determining whether a lump sum payment in exchange for the employer and carrier's release from liability is in the best interest of the claimant and determining whether the amount of the settlement is proper under the statute. Where the parties stipulate that the proposed final settlement of liability for the employer for compensation shall not be subject to modification or review under Section 440.28, the judge is directed to make or caused to make such investigation as he considers necessary to determine whether such final disposition will definitely aid the rehabilitation of the injured worker or otherwise is clearly for the best interest of the person entitled to compensation.
586 So.2d 1273, 16 Fla. L. Week. D2544, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Sep 30, 1991)
Parties entered into a joint petition settlement agreement wherein the employer/carrier agreed to pay costs along with other parts of the claim for benefits. Court determined that joint petition was referring only to taxable costs as opposed to costs in general. Generally, a prevailing party may only collect taxable costs rather than all costs which they have incurred. Costs do not include attorney's fee.
580 So.2d 263, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1372, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., May 14, 1991)
Question certified to Florida Supreme Court as to whether an employer/carrier that has entered into a totally controverted washout settlement pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(b) Florida Statutes and has proven that a portion of the settlement constitutes payment of excess compensation is entitled to reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund. Concurring opinion.
574 So.2d 176, 16 Fla. L. Week. D213, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jan 15, 1991)
Claimant and employer/carrier entered into a settlement agreement whereby claimant was paid a lump sum plus an annuity with a provision that the claimant's PT supplemental benefits would be continued. The employer/carrier would be responsible for continued contribution to the administrative trust fund for the payment of supplemental benefits. The supplemental benefits were to be paid by the state in accordance with the law that existed at the time of this accident. When the State of Florida refused to pay these supplemental benefits claim was brought to enforce the terms of the washout agreement. Employer/carrier was responsible for paying the supplemental benefits. The carrier should be treated as having elected to pay supplemental benefits directly to the claimant as opposed to having the administrative trust fund pay for these benefits.There is no provision in Chapter 400 that prohibits a workers' compensation insurance carrier from funding future permanent total disability benefits through the acquisition of an annuity from a related insurance entity so long as the carrier continues its liability for such compensation benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The employer/carrier in this instance settled a PT claim through the use of an annuity purchased from a sister company.
573 So.2d 100, 16 Fla. L. Week. 136, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jan 03, 1991)
A lump sum settlement cannot settle future medical. Lump sum settlements are void as against public policy if they undertake to limit the employer/carrier's responsibility for future medical expenses. An attempted partial waiver of future medical is void just as an attempted waiver of all future medical expenses.
565 So.2d 380, 15 Fla. L. Week. D2067, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Aug 08, 1990)
Parties agreed to a settlement authorizing a particular doctor. That settlement was thereafter dissolved on appeal. Court determined that stipulation as to treating physician and prior settlement was of no effect since the agreement had been dissolved on appeal.
564 So.2d 1201, 15 Fla. L. Week. D1951, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jul 25, 1990)
Hearing held on settlement with parties agreeing that case had been settled. Written stipulation as to the terms of the settlement would be signed at a later date. After settlement and prior to signing of agreement claimant changed her mind and refused to settle. Court determined that settlement had not become effective as of hearing since the agreement had not been reduced to writing and signed by the parties. Also the agreement had not been dictated into the record at the time of the hearing.
513 So.2d 187, 12 Fla. L. Week. 2222, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Sep 09, 1987)
The provision of plastic surgery treatment to correct facial disfigurement resulting from industrial accident is payable under Section 440.13 Florida Statutes.The court will not recognize an agreement to release the employer/carrier from paying future medical. The waiver of future medical expenses is contrary to Section 440.20(12)a Florida Statute and is void.
505 So.2d 604, 12 Fla. L. Week. 1004, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Apr 10, 1987)
Parties stipulated in Joint Petition Settlement Agreement that certain medicals were not related to claimant's accident. Court determined that this stipulation should be enforced and denied subsequent claim for payment of medical bills that had been stipulated not to be related to compensable accident.A stipulation in Joint Petition Settlement Agreement that certain medicals are not related to accident but others are does not constitue a violation of Section 440.20(12)(a) Florida Statutes precluding settlements of future medical.
503 So.2d 406, 12 Fla. L. Week. 602, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Feb 24, 1987)
Attorney's fee awarded under the "medical only" provisions of Section 440.34(3)(a) F.S. where attendant care services were paid by the employer/carrier after a claim was filed for such services but before the actual hearing. When a claimant prevails on a claim for medical benefits only the employer and carrier become liable for an attorney's fee without reference to the extent of fault or other reason given for denying payment of the claimed benefits.A written stipulation purporting to be evidence of the settlement of certain issues in this case failed to comply with Rule 4.130 Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure in that it was not signed by claimant or his attorney. Accordingly it was error for DC to accept stipulation as settlement of the issues.DC affirmed by court in awarding attendant care services for 16 hours per day rather than 24 hours per day. Claimant needed supervision 24 hours per day; however DC ruled that paying the claimant on a 16-hour per day basis was the equivalent of reimbursing the claimant for attendant care services at an amount equivalent to or more than the amount a 24-hour per day live in attendant would receive.
498 So.2d 1042, 11 Fla. L. Week. 2633, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Dec 16, 1986)
While on appeal after the granting of an insolvency petition employer/carrier and claimant settled case. No provision was made for the payment of appellate costs incurred by Division of Worker's Compensation pursuant to insolvency petition. Deputy commissioner ordered the employer/carrier to pay these costs and this order was affirmed on appeal.
496 So.2d 950, 11 Fla. L. Week. 2275, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Oct 29, 1986)
A lump sum settlement agreement between the employer/carrier and the claimant is not final and enforceable until or unless it has been approved by the Deputy Commissioner.
481 So.2d 76, 11 Fla. L. Week. 115, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jan 03, 1986)
The settlement of a workers' compensation claim has the effect of also foreclosing further entitlement to permanent total supplemental benefits.
480 So.2d 693, 11 Fla. L. Week. 74, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Dec 30, 1985)
Employer/carrier settled with claimant designating certain sums in settlement agreement as temporary compensation benefits payable in the future. Since employer/carrier failed to show that claimant was entitled to future temporary compensation court affirmed DC's order denying reimbursement from the Special Disability Trust Fund for these benefits.
485 So.2d 1290, 10 Fla. L. Week. 2624, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Nov 22, 1985)
On Motion for Rehearing court determined that the provisions of 440.20(12)(a) F.S. pertain to lump sum advancements as well as washouts. Court ruled that the payment of compensation based on claimant's life expectancy represented all benefits that she would be entitled to and accordingly was the same as a washout.Court reversed DC's award of advancement of lump sum permanent total benefits. Court determined that a full lump sum payment based on claimant's full life expectancy would preclude claimant's future entitlement to permanent total supplemental benefits.
470 So.2d 865, 10 Fla. L. Week. 1486, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jun 14, 1985)
The parties to a settlement agreement failed to present material facts to the deputy commissioner which precluded him from being able to properly evaluate a settlement agreement. The facts of this case were determined by the court to be sufficient to justify setting aside settlement agreement notwithstanding the fact that the claimant was represented by counsel at the time the settlement agreement was entered into by the parties.
463 So.2d 502, 10 Fla. L. Week. 374, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Feb 11, 1985)
Claimant suffered two distinct accidents while employed by same employer but insured by two different insurers. Following first accident claimant returned to work after medical bills were paid by first carrier. After second accident second carrier settled case with claimant. Claimant then filed claim against first carrier for benefits following second accident. Court reversed deputy's award of benefits holding that there can be no apportionment for medicals and temporary total disability following second accident pursuant to Section 440.15(5) F.S. Indicta court ruled that deputy commissioner is prohibited from apportioning medical and temporary total benefits even in 440.42 proceedings involving disputes between two carriers. Dissenting opinion by Judge Ervin who held that in multiple injury situations involving different employers or different carriers the primary issue is the causation as to which injury is causing the disability and whether the new injury is characterized as a recurrence or aggravation of the preexisting condition.
453 So.2d 169, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jul 19, 1984)
Court affirmed deputy's order granting claimant's "motion to set aside and/or vacate" a prior order approving a joint petition for lump sum settlement. The claimant had not reached maximum medical improvement six months prior to the settlement.
453 So.2d 79, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jul 18, 1984)
Deputy commissioner approved settlement between claimant and employer/carrier with medical remaining open. In settlement petition employee stipulated that maximum medical improvement had been reached that he had been discharged from further treatment and no further treatment as a result of the accident was required. Thereafter claimant sought alternate medical care. The medical evidence suggested no further treatment was necessary and the only basis for any change in medical care was the claimant's testimony of continued pain. Court ruled this insufficient evidence to support additional medical care. Even though order approving the settlement left open future medical benefits the claimant is not unconditionally entitled to such medical benefits. Court also noted that remedial care after MMI is not authorized.
453 So.2d 462, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jul 13, 1984)
The Special Disability Trust Fund has standing to contest the reasonableness of a settlement/washout entered into between employer/carrier and a claimant. This standing of the fund as to the reasonableness of a settlement exists notwithstanding the fact that the settlement may have been reasonable from the standpoint of the employer/carrier and the claimant. A claimant's life expectancy is the proper criteria to be used in determining a claimant's probability of death pursuant to Section 440.20(12)(b) F.S. The possibility of the claimant regaining his earning capacity is to be disregarded in this calculation.
450 So.2d 313, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., May 22, 1984)
Court determined that when considering lump sum payments pursuant to Section 440.20(12) F.S. the law as of the date of the accident controls.
444 So.2d 1038, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Jan 18, 1984)
Employer/carrier settled claimant's workers' compensation case at a time prior to the running of six months from the date of MMI. Section 440.20(12((a) F.S. provides that a lump sum settlement can only be made after six months from the date of MMI. Court ruled this was mandatory language and settlement made within the six month period was subject to being set aside.
444 So.2d 39, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Dec 28, 1983)
Court determined that claimant's attorney's fees could not be obtained in one lump sum payment through the advancement provisions of the Florida Workers' Compensation Act. See also: Board of County Commissioners v. Shepard AR 144 dated 12/28/83. <\i (Not in database and not linked)>The 4% discount factor in the Florida Statutes applies only to the irrevocable lump sum washout settlements of all future compensation benefits and not to advancements.The Court held that it would not be in the best interests of a permanently and totally disabled claimant to obtain an advance payment reduced to present value in order to pay his attorney's fees. As the strong dissent notes the finding that this advance payment is prejudicial to the carrier seems completely at odds with the decision in < Sanford v. Alachua County School Board 425 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) Case_1760>. The Court also notes parenthetically that the discount factor applies only to washout settlements not lump sum advancements (this finding is questionable but is not crucial to the ruling in this case.)
439 So.2d 993, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Oct 26, 1983)
The question in this case is whether the Division of Workers' Compensation is entitled to recover costs of an appeal when the claimant prevails but the claimant's attorney is denied attorney's fees. Court determined under this circumstance that claimant had prevailed although attorney's fees were denied on appeal and accordingly the Division was entitled to reimbursement of the costs that it had paid pursuant to a petition for insolvency. The burden of insuring that the Division's costs were included in the settlement was on the employer/carrier.Claimant appealed DC's order denying benefits and qualified under insolvency petition requiring Division to pay for cost of appeal. Case thereafter remanded and settled between parties. DC denied cost assessment filed by Division determining that had the case been decided by district court the employer/carrier would have prevailed thus not allowing the claimant to collect costs. Court reversed holding that employer/carrier was liable to Division for payment of these costs. The burden of insuring that the Division's costs were included in the settlement was on the employer/carrier.When W/C case is settled upon remand from district court of appeal it is the burden of the employer/carrier to include in the settlement negotiations a provision for the payment of the Division of Workers' Compensation for payment of insolvency appellate costs. DC does not have the authority to determine that the Division of Workers' Compensation should not be reimbursed its costs based on the fact that the employer/carrier would have prevailed on appeal.
436 So.2d 309, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Aug 05, 1983)
The obligation of the employer/carrier to pay benefits pursuant to a settlement agreement begins to run on the date copies of the order are mailed to the parties. The hearing on the settlement had been held previous to the time the order was mailed and at the hearing the DC ruled that he was approving the settlement. However the order approving the settlement was not actually mailed to the parties until sometime thereafter. The court ruled that date of the mailing of the order and not the hearing on the settlement was the controlling date when benefits should be paid.
407 So.2d 1025, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Dec 29, 1981)
Parties entered into a settlement agreement whereby it was agreed that the claimant's attorney would be paid a fee to be determined by the judge. It was agreed that the fee would not come out of the proceeds being paid to the claimant. Court determined that it was error to apportion the awarded attorney's fees requiring the claimant to pay a portion of the amount as provided for in Section 440.34, (Florida Statutes 1978).
403 So.2d 488, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Aug 17, 1981)
County promised injured employee that it would appropriate a sum of money for the injured employee if he would settle with the W/C insurance company for an amount less than what employee thought to be reasonable. After settling with insurance company county refused appropriation alleging that claimant's exclusive remedy was under the terms of the W/C Act and he was not entitled to a special appropriation of public funds for a work related injury since this would be an unconstitutional gift contrary to Florida Constitution. Court ruled that under normal circumstances this would be an unconstitutional gift. However the employee gave up a valuable consideration for the special appropriation and he was induced into compromising his W/C claim by waiving a judicially enforcable right. Court determined that this was not an unconstitutional gift and required the county to pay according to its settlement.
402 So.2d 518, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Aug 13, 1981)
Court ruled that the washout provision of the new law statute was constitutional. Accordingly the legislature can control the method of settling W/C cases and in particular preclude the settlement of future medical.
396 So.2d 1201, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Apr 21, 1981)
Judge entered order establishing percentage of responsibility between two employer/carriers for two separate accidents. Thereafter, claimant settled claim with first accident employer/carrier and thereafter sought full recovery from second employer/carrier for total benefits. Court determined that claimant was bound by decision of judge dividing responsibility between the two employer/carriers. There was no sufficient evidence of record to warrant a modification of the prior order entered by the judge dividing responsibility between the two employer/carriers.
394 So.2d 212, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Feb 23, 1981)
Under Section 440.20(10) F.S. a lump sum settlement agreement between an employer carrier and claimant is not final and enforceable until or unless it has been approved by the Deputy Commissioner. Either party may legally withdraw from a settlement agreement prior to the Deputy Commissioner's approval.
390 So.2d 709, (Fla., Nov 20, 1980)
The question in this case is whether a stipulation between the parties can later be modified based upon a change in circumstances. Employer/carrier and employee agreed that the employee was entitled to nursing services and so stipulated on the record. Thereafter the claimant voluntarily stopped the nursing services and the question is whether the employer/carrier could file a Petition for Modification trying to modify the prior stipulation between the parties. Court allowed the stipulation to be modified based upon change in circumstances.
389 So.2d 1254, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Nov 17, 1980)
Claimant settled with W/C carrier and 19 days after order approving settlement filed a Jones Act case. Carrier then filed a motion to Vacate the order approving the settlement since it had not become final based upon a misrepresentation by the claimant as to the subject matter jurisdiction of the settlement. Court allowed the settlement to be set aside.
386 So.2d 883, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Aug 18, 1980)
First DCA found that a Judge of Industrial Claims has the authority to set aside a settlement agreement when the settlement was based upon fraud and/or misrepresentation. In this case the claimant lied about the fact that he was working at the time of the settlement and upon motion by the employer/carrier the judge was authorized to overturn settlement.Deputy Commissioner has the authority to set aside a settlement agreement when the settlement was based upon fraud and/or misrepresentation. In this case the claimant lied about the fact that he was working at the time of the settlement and upon motion by the employer/carrier the judge was authorized to throw the settlement out.
384 So.2d 156, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Apr 16, 1980)
Where no fraud has been practiced on the workman or his employer and no mutual mistake in a contract for settlement the courts are bound to respect and enforce the settlements made by the parties and are powerless to disturb such contracts of settlement. In this case the employer failed to mention to the JIC a substantially higher rating than was represented to the Judge in the first instance and based on this misrepresentation by the carrier the joint petition was overturned.
378 So.2d 801, (Fla.App. 1 Dist., Dec 07, 1979)
Court denied penalty based on equitable basis for the carrier's failure to timely pay joint petition settlement order.
IRC Order 2-3517, August 30, 1978
Hospital is an interested party in proceedings before JIC and has standing to object to a joint petition.
IRC Order 2-3430, May 11, 1978
Claimant agreed before JIC to settlement of case with understanding that signature on J.P. would only be formality. Court ruled that claimant could not thereafter backout.
358 So.2d 1, (Fla., Mar 02, 1978)
SDTF is an interested party in proceedings on claimant's case and can intervene in lump sum settlement proceedings.
IRC Order 2-3251, October 10, 1977
Where settlement made no reference to payment of costs and this was approved by JIC claimant could not thereafter come back and try to modify order approving J.P. to get these extra benefits.
IRC Order 2-3240, September 29, 1977
SDTF is an interested party in proceedings on claimant's case and can intervene in lump sum settlement proceedings.Attorney fees cannot be awarded against the Special Disability Trust Fund.
327 So.2d 888, (Fla.App. 3 Dist., Feb 10, 1976)
Claimant settled his workers' compensation claim with city. Thereafter, city attempted to deduct from pension benefits due amounts pain in workers' compensation benefits. Court determined that as a part of the settlement agreement under the Workers' Compensation Act, workers' compensation benefits would not be a setoff against pension benefits. Accordingly, setoff denied.In reviewing workers' compensation orders, a denial of certiorari by the Florida Supreme Court constitutes a finding that the Industrial Relations Commission had acted strictly in accordance with the law and has not departed from the essential requirements of the law.
IRC Order 2-2898, December 15, 1975
JIC approved oral washout contingent upon parties signing J.P. Before signing written J.P. claimant backed out. IRC said that oral washout approval was not binding on claimant.
293 So.2d 354, (Fla., Apr 17, 1974)
The mere return of claimant to work without more does not preclude a finding of "continuous disability" under Section 440.16. In this case claimant had returned to work but was still having problems with chlorine smoke inhalation. Death benefits awarded.Employee died after washout of his claims for benefits under W/C statute. Court held washout also included any claim for death benefits possibly payable to dependents.
IRC Order 2-2442, March 28, 1974
JIC can enter washout petition order pending appeal to commission. Establishes procedure. See current rules of procedure.
IRC Order 2-2424, October 8, 1973
Hospital was considered an interested party for washout proceedings.
281 So.2d 364, (Fla.App. 2 Dist., Aug 15, 1973)
The question in this case is whether a release given by an employee to a third party tort feasor bars a later suit against the tort feasor by the W/C carrier who had no notice of the settlement and release yet was forced to pay benefits to the employee after the settlement. Ordinarily in the case where the employee has settled with a third party tort feasor the W/C is relegated to getting an equitable distribution of the proceeds received from the tort feasor by the employee. However if the tort feasor knew when he settled the action that the employer was within the scope of his duty and the W/C carrier would soon enter the picture then the tort feasor might be equitably estopped from claiming the release on a defense. See this case for factors to determine the fairness of a settlement.
IRC Order 2-3434
Claimant employed attorney and washed case out. IRC ruled that even after approval of washout attorney could obtain fee.
IRC Order 2-3834
First attorney filed lien for attorney fee and withdrew from claimant's case. Second attorney settled claimant's case and judge dismissed lien for attorney fees filed by first attorney. Affirmed.
594 So.2d 329, 17 FLW D556
Court determined that it was error to deny penalty against the employer/carrier on the ground that the carrier had not received notice of the entry of an order approving a lump sum settlement. Since Section 440.20(12)(c), Florida Statutes, requires the Judge of Compensation Claims to enter an order approving a lump sum settlement within 7 days of the filing of such joint petition and stipulation, the employer/carrier had constructive knowledge of when the order must have been entered. Failure to pay within 30 days of the entry of the order approving a lump sum settlement deemed to be the basis for the award of penalties.
545 So.2d 1341, 14 FLW 287
The question before the Supreme Court in this case is whether settlement proceeds from a workers' compensation case are considered marital property to be divided between spouses or are they the sole property of the injured employee. The court adopted the "analytical approach" in making this determination. The portion of the settlement award representing past lost wages and loss of earning capacity and past medical expenses paid from marital funds is considered marital property. The portion of the settlement representing future loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity and future medical expenses are the separate property of the injured spouse. The calculation of past and future loss of wages and earning capacity as well as past and future medical expenses is governed by the when the marriage ended.
Court set aside prior joint petition settlement agreement between the parties. The JCC did not have full knowledge of the claimant's medical condition at the time of theapproved lump sum settlement.
Prior to the approval of any settlement agreement, the parties must provide the JCC with all evidence in their possession which is material to the proposed settlement. Atthe time of the settlement, the claimant was not aware of the existence of a written report from the doctor which established a causal relationship between the claimant's medical condition and his employment. Such report had not been given to the judge prior to his approval of the settlement although it was unclear as to whether the employer/carrier had obtained a copy of the medical report. Failure to provide the medical report to the judge prior to the approval of the settlement was grounds to set aside the settlement agreement.
Claimant settled workers' compensation by joint petition agreement. Court determined that employer was not responsible for any alleged acts of violating Section 440.205,F.S., for activities prior to the signing of the joint petition agreement. There was an allegation of wrongful discharge subsequent to the joint petition settlement agreement and court ruled that the joint petition did not preclude such a wrongful termination cause of action. The settlement and release of the workers' compensation claim would not bar an action for subsequent wrongful termination alleged to be the result of the workers' compensation claim. The release was valid only to claims which had matured at the time of the execution of the release.
Claimant sustained two accidents while employed by two different carriers, the combination of the two causing the claimant to be PT. Second accident settled for $125,000and claimant sought recovery for PT benefits against employer/carrier for first accident. In determining whether a washout of second accident precludes recovery for additional benefits from first accident, the question involves the construction of the washout settlement agreement and is a question of law. However, if the terms of the agreement are susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented. In cases when such a fact issue is presented, the JCC must make the initial determination as to the intended effect of the settlement. Case remanded to JCC with instructions to determine the intended effect of the settlement of the second accident.